

(CLASSIFICATION)

Executive Registry

63-8446

## OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Action Memorandum No. A-313Date 8 November 1963

TO : Deputy Director/Intelligence  
 Att: Assistant Director/National Estimates

Deputy Director/Science & Technology  
 Att: Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence

SUBJECT : Procedure for Approval of Certain Nuclear Tests

REFERENCE: NSAM No. 269 DOE review completed.

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 DET/WE  
 ACTION

1. NSAM No. 269 establishes a committee for the review of U. S. nuclear tests which "might give rise to a claimed violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." The Director of Central Intelligence is named as a member of this committee. Agencies sponsoring a nuclear test are required by this NSAM to prepare detailed studies of effects associated with such tests which include analyses of the distribution of radioactive debris, atmospheric effects, possibility of foreign detection, visible phenomena and planned or expected publicity.

2. In order that CIA can provide the effective staff support for the DCI as a member of this committee, it will be necessary that the Office of Scientific Intelligence provide the necessary technological support, and the Office of National Estimates provide the necessary analysis of foreign reaction. To this effect the Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence is designated as the focal point for providing the staff support to the DCI and will work in close collaboration with the Assistant Director/National Estimates.

MEMORANDUM

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

NSC review(s) completed.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick  
 Executive Director

SUSPENSE DATE:


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(CLASSIFICATION)

SECRET



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1963

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF NSAM'S NOS. 210 AND 269

SUBJECT: Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests

1. In view of the close similarity of the composition and functions of the committees established under NSAM's Nos. 210 and 269, the two committees have been combined into a committee to be called the "Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests".

2. The Review Committee, under the chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will be composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, or their designated representatives.

3. The Review Committee will perform the functions specified in NSAM's Nos. 210 and 269 which the new Committee will replace.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

SECRET

102-915

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1962

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 210

TO:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
The Director, Office of Science and Technology  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Underground Nuclear Tests

1. The President has directed the establishment of a Working Group on Underground Nuclear Tests to be comprised of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman), the Atomic Energy Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of Science and Technology. The departmental representatives should be designated promptly and their names reported to this office.

2. The Working Group will review the schedule of tests for the remainder of FY 1963 and for FY 1964, and the policy and technical justifications therefor, to determine if the schedule is consistent with the requirements of national security and with foreign policy.

3. The Group's conclusions and recommendations should be transmitted to the President as soon as possible and no later than March 4, 1963.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

Information copies to:

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

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05-6791

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1963

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## MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF NSAM NO. 210

SUBJECT: Review of the FY 1964 Underground Testing Program

1. The President has requested that the existing FY 1964 underground testing program be reviewed in light of the partial test ban treaty, ratification of which appears to be imminent, and the statements pertaining to underground testing contained in the letter dated August 23, 1963, to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Top Secret annex thereto, both signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

2. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense are requested to initiate review of those parts of the testing program for which they are responsible, and to submit their recommendations for any revisions in the program to the working group established by NSAM No. 210, for its review of the policy and technical justifications supporting the recommendations. The working group will generally review the entire program to determine if it is consistent with the requirements of national security and with foreign policy.

3. In view of possible implications for certain appropriations requests now pending before the Congress, the President has requested that the results of this review be transmitted to him as soon as possible and no later than September 23, 1963. The agency recommendations should be forwarded to the working group by September 16.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge BundySECRET

63-406

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1963

Noted by Del. 25X1

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NOTE TO HOLDERS OF NSAM NO. 210

1. The President has reviewed the list of underground tests proposed for FY 1964 by the Department of Defense and the AEC. He has directed that the present budget estimates be maintained. Within this budgetary ceiling, he has approved a quota of 30 weapons development tests and 15 other tests.
2. The AEC and the DOD, with such assistance as they may request from the interagency committee established by NSAM 210, are requested to develop a program within these limits and present it for final approval.
3. Should a decision be made to develop very large yield warheads, additional underground tests needed for that development program can be presented for approval outside these quotas.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

RECEIVED THE NSAM #210

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Executive Registry

103-8252

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 31, 1963

*Noted by [unclear]  
11/5*

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 269

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Special Assistant to the President for Science  
and Technology

SUBJECT: Procedure for Approval of Certain Nuclear Tests

The President has directed that the following procedure be instituted for the review and approval of nuclear tests that might violate or be regarded as violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A nuclear test that is intended to be fully contained underground will be included in this category if there is a significant possibility that the test will place measurable amounts of radioactive debris beyond the boundaries of the United States under circumstances in which the debris could be credibly related to the test. Any other nuclear test which by its nature could reasonably give rise to domestic or foreign charges of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will be included in this category even though the sponsoring agency believes that the charges would prove to be unfounded.

1. In planning the nuclear test program, the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense will make every effort to avoid tests that might be regarded as being a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is recognized that this will be a matter of judgment since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty does not contain precise technical criteria as to the nature of prohibited tests.

2. If the Atomic Energy Commission or the Secretary of Defense believes after careful study that a particular test should remain in the program despite the possibility that it might give rise to a claimed violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the sponsoring agency will submit the test for review by a committee, under the chairmanship

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of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, composed of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, or their designated representatives.

3. In support of the proposals for each nuclear test of this type, the sponsoring agency will prepare for the reviewing committee a detailed study of the importance of the proposed test and the possible direct or indirect effects associated with the test that might be regarded as evidence of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The study of effects associated with the test will include an analysis of a) the anticipated distribution of particulate and gaseous radioactive debris under the full range of possible meteorological conditions; b) the extent to which blast, electromagnetic, and other direct radiation phenomena associated with the test will occur in the atmosphere; c) the possibility that various foreign countries would be able to detect the anticipated level of radioactive debris and other phenomena associated with the tests with their detection instrumentation; d) visible phenomena in the vicinity of the test site; and e) planned or expected publicity.

4. The reviewing committee will be given sufficient notice of proposals for nuclear tests of this type to permit adequate consideration by the committee and any necessary action with minimum impact on the program in question.

5. If the committee finds that the proposed test is acceptable under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the committee will submit its recommendation to the President for his approval. No test of this type will be conducted without the approval of the President after the procedure prescribed in this memorandum.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

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